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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2289 
 ___________ 
 
 RUDY STANKO, 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
BARACK OBAMA; HARLEY G. LAPPIN,  
National Director of the Bureau of Prisons; D. SCOTT DODRILL, Northeast Regional 
Director, now Asst. Director of BOP; DAVID EBBERT, Warden, FCI Allenwood 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 4-09-cv-02421) 
 District Judge:  Honorable James F. McClure, Jr. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 5, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 (Opinion filed April 7, 2011)                                                                
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Rudy Stanko, a federal prisoner, filed a petition in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  He complained 
that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment after he attempted to send legal 
correspondence to his attorney.  He also alleged various due process violations relating to 
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a disciplinary hearing at which he was found guilty of stealing from the prison law library 
and sanctioned to a loss of twenty-seven days of good conduct time.  He further claimed 
that the hearing constituted a prohibited bill of attainder.  On screening, the District Court 
dismissed all but Stanko‟s due process claim.1  Respondent then argued that because that 
claim not been exhausted administratively, it too should be dismissed.  Upon review, the 
District Court concluded the same and entered an order dismissing the petition.  Stanko 
appeals. 
II. 
  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we may 
affirm on any grounds supported by the record.  See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 
n.1 (3d Cir. 2001).  Our review of the District Court‟s legal conclusions is plenary.  See 
Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2000).  We will affirm the District Court‟s 
judgment. 
  The District Court properly dismissed Stanko‟s claim challenging his 
prison conditions.  Stanko alleged that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment after he attempted to send legal correspondence to 
his attorney.  Specifically, he claimed that he was thrown in the “hole” and given “diesel 
                                                 
1
 Also on screening, the District Court noted that the only proper respondent was 
Stanko‟s custodian, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435-36 (2004), and 
dismissed the other respondents from the suit. 
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therapy.”2 
  A prisoner may challenge the execution of his sentence in a habeas petition 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 243 
(3d Cir. 2005).  However, “although a § 2241 attack on the execution of a sentence may 
challenge some matters that occur at prison, such as deprivation of good-time credits and 
other prison disciplinary matters . . . this does not make § 2241 actions like „condition of 
confinement‟ lawsuits, which are brought under civil rights laws.”  McIntosh v. United 
States Parole Comm‟n, 115 F.3d 809, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).  We 
agree with the District Court that Stanko‟s claim of cruel and unusual punishment  
resulting from his attempt to correspond with his attorney falls outside the realm of 
challenges which may be brought in habeas. 
  The District Court also correctly dismissed Stanko‟s due process claim on 
the basis that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his habeas 
petition.  Stanko was subject to a July 16, 2009 hearing before a Disciplinary Hearing 
Officer (“DHO”) for having been accused of stealing a document belonging to the prison 
law library.  Stanko admitted the charges during the hearing and was found guilty.  As a 
result, he was sanctioned to a loss of twenty-seven days of good conduct time and given 
thirty days of disciplinary segregation.  He was also recommended for a disciplinary 
transfer.   
                                                 
2
  Stanko defines diesel therapy as being transported in shackles and a belly-chain 
around the country with stops in the “holes” of various federal prison facilities. 
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  On October 20, 2009, Stanko filed an administrative appeal with the 
Bureau of Prisons‟ (“BOP”) Northeast Regional Office.  The appeal was denied on 
November 16, 2009, and Stanko was informed of his right to appeal the ruling to the 
BOP‟s Central Office.  On November 24, 2009, Stanko filed an appeal with the Central 
Office, but it was later rejected because he failed to attach a copy of the Regional 
Office‟s ruling.  Stanko was instructed to re-file his appeal within fifteen days of January 
8, 2010, the date of the BOP Central Office‟s rejection letter. 
  Stanko filed his habeas petition on December 2, 2009, almost one month 
before the Central Office responded to his appeal.  In the petition, he alleged that his due 
process rights were violated during the “sham” hearing on July 16, 2009, and he sought 
to have his good conduct time restored.   
  As the District Court explained, a federal prisoner is ordinarily required to 
exhaust available administrative remedies prior to seeking review under § 2241.  See 
Moscato v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996).  This Court has 
“consistently applied an exhaustion requirement to claims brought under § 2241,”  
Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000), and the present case, as the District 
Court determined, warrants no exception to the rule. 
  With respect to Stanko‟s claim that the July 16, 2009 disciplinary 
proceeding constituted a prohibited bill of attainder, we need not decide whether the 
claim sounds in habeas because, even if it does, the claim is meritless.  A bill of attainder 
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is “a legislative Act which inflicts punishment on named individuals or members of an 
easily ascertainable group without a judicial trial.”  United States v. O‟Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 384 (1968).  The disciplinary hearing was not a legislative act and thus, it does not 
constitute a bill of attainder. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
 
 
